The impacts of the Cold Air Outbreak (CAO) of 8–21 February 2021 would have been mitigated if the power outages were also, by that time, identified as a risk or hazard for Texas

The month of February 2021 remains memorable and historic due to the climate disaster that occurred during that period, most notably in Texas. This historic winter event has been described by the National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI, 2023) as "the Great Texas Freeze," as Texas experienced extremely low temperatures (wind chill values below zero). According to NCEI (2023), due to power outages it became the first billion-dollar weather disaster, and an estimated 10 million people were left in the dark, without heat or the ability to cook food. Albers et al. (2022) also confirmed that “during the two weeks of 8–21 February 2021, average temperatures in the region were more than 30°F below normal, with more than 60 daily minimum temperature records broken at various locations, and over 1,000 power generating units failed in Texas alone leading to weeks of both power and water shortages for close to 10 million people.”1 This represented a great deal of suffering for households that found themselves without electricity and were forced — in freezing conditions — to relocate to hotels or other buildings serving as shelters. The families who remained in their homes had to quickly find rudimentary ways to keep themselves and their children warm. Furthermore, without electricity or heating, the water supply ceased to flow, as it froze within the pipes. For these families, the lack of water created numerous complications, affecting everything from the cooking of food to the use of sanitary facilities. According to Svitek (2022), “the number of people who lost their lives following the February 2021 power outages has finally been estimated to 246”5. We are not suggesting that the various reports we consulted link all these deaths to the power outages, as there were also several deaths resulting from accidents on major Texas highways. Even so, Svitek (2022) notes that "close to two-thirds of the deaths were due to hypothermia."

Source: National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI, 2023)

Given what is known about the climate in Texas, not expecting winters would be as cold as the one experienced in February 2021; this would explain why meteorological forecasts and disaster prevention tools of that period did not account for the possibility of Texas facing weather conditions that could lead to a total power failure. The NCEI (2023) reports that, during this period, Texas experienced six to nine consecutive days of freezing temperatures, setting a record for the longest freezing streak ever documented in the state’s history. In this article, we analyze the disaster preparedness tools that Texas had in place at the time, seeking to understand why power outages were not considered as a risk factor or hazard and that might also explain why the state was caught so off guard by the disaster of February 2021. The major power outage that the State of Texas faced due to the "record-low temperatures in February 2021 and snow and ice made roads impassable, the state's electric grid operator lost control of the power supply, leaving millions without access to electricity. As the blackouts extended from hours to days, top state lawmakers called for investigations into the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, and Texans demanded accountability for the disaster"11.

Considering that the Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM)6 is primarily responsible for disaster preparedness and for the day-to-day emergency management activities. “TDEM Preparedness administers a statewide emergency management program focusing on all-hazards emergency planning, training, exercise, and continuous improvement”7. When the Cold Air Outbreak (CAO) of February 2021 occurred, the TDEM had a basic plan of the State of Texas Emergency Management Plan which was last updated in February 20209. Let us note that W. Nim Kidd, the Chief of the TDEM, recognizes to the introduction of this document that “no state is more diverse in its climate, geography, culture, industry, and commerce than Texas”9. It is worth also to note that “the state of Texas has 10 climatic regions and 11 different ecological regions”7(p5). According to W. Nim Kidd, this leads to “the unique challenges this diversity presents in preparing for and responding to disasters and emergencies”9.

On the fifth page of the State of Texas Emergency Management Plan, state planners have listed 22 hazards of significant risk in Texas9. These 22 primary threats and hazards confronted by the state of Texas are classified into 3 categories: natural hazards (hurricane, tropical storms, flooding, wildfire, pandemic, winter weather, ...), technological hazards (dam failure, chemical hazmat release and radiological incidents) and human caused hazards (cross-border violence, explosive devices, active shooter, cyber-attack, terrorism, ...). Based on primary threats confronted by the state of Texas, the TDEM has subdivided the state into 8 different regions (Region 1, Region 2, Region 3, Region 4, Region 5, Region 6, Region 7 and Region 8)6. It is indicated that the “emergency management activities in the state of Texas vary significantly in type, size and complexity”9(p7).

For the state of Texas, it is clearly mentioned that local governments have the primary responsibility for responding to disasters, and Texas' basic Emergency Management plan reveals that they have the resources to always provide these responses. As it is highlighted “in Texas, the initial response to emergencies and disasters is conducted by local jurisdictions working with city or county emergency management officials. A local government is expected to use its own resources and the resources available to it through mutual aid agreements before requesting assistance from the state”9(p7). Regarding public-private coordination in response to a disaster, the Texas’s Emergency Management plan shows that there are two possibilities for considering or activating the public-private partnership. On the one hand, “if the scope of the incident has expanded beyond the resource capabilities of the state, the State Operations Center (SOC) may seek intrastate mutual aid, assistance from voluntary and private sector organizations and/or federal aid as needed”9(p8).

On the twelfth page of State of Texas Emergency Management Plan, we are provided with a list of private sector actors working to respond to disasters, including: (1) Texas Citizens Corps which is an association of five independent organizations that focus on readiness and response among Texas' communities (Community Emergency Response Teams - CERT, Fire Corps, National Neighborhood Watch Program, Volunteers in Police Service – VIPS and Medical Reserve Corps - MRC), (2) the Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters (VOADs) which make up an important piece of Texas' emergency response plan because they have the personnel and expertise to augment the state's capabilities or provide capabilities that the state does not have, and (3) the Business and industry partners which play a key role before, during and after disasters; because large portions of Texas’ infrastructure are privately owned, large amounts of the hazardous materials moved within or through Texas, are handled by private industry, and business and industry partners must observe standards for the protection of critical infrastructure and develop individual continuity of operations plans9 (p12).

It should be noted that there are Critical Infrastructures (abbreviated as CI) that must be protected at all costs, as their malfunction inevitably leads to unfortunate consequences for communities. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan of 2013 has outlined sixteen CI Sectors and pointed out that “our Nation's well-being relies upon secure and resilient CI — the assets, systems, and networks that underpin American society”3. According to the Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), “the Presidential Policy Directive 21 identifies the Energy Sector as uniquely critical because it provides an enabling function across all critical infrastructure sectors. The energy infrastructure is divided into three interrelated segments: electricity, oil, and natural gas. The reliance of virtually all industries on electric power and fuels means that all sectors have some dependence on the Energy Sector”2. The CAO of February 2021 was a true disaster halo effect that had paralyzed all other sectors of life and other critical infrastructure sectors in the State of Texas.

In our view, the lesson learned from this disaster of the Great Texas Freeze has led the TDEM’ authorities to improve the disaster prevention mechanisms and the Texas Emergency Basic Plan. The current plan, approved in January 2025, includes key provisions that establish safeguards and assure the public that, even in the event of severe weather, the electricity supply will be maintained—or, should an interruption occur, promptly restored. In this new document, 27 hazards posing a significant risk have been identified for Texas, compared to 22 hazards in 2020. Furthermore, "severe weather" has now been added to the list of natural hazards, alongside "extreme cold" and "winter weather," which were already included (TDEM, 2025 p3). Through these efforts and improvements, Texas now has a highly sophisticated emergency management plan that involves stakeholders working across key areas of community life. Appendix C of this document introduces the concept of "Emergency Support Functions" (ESFs). Twenty distinct ESFs10 have been identified; in essence, these are clusters of services and stakeholders that work together to ensure the proper functioning of a specific sector. Consequently, regardless of the risks encountered or the prevailing weather conditions, those involved in each ESF are expected to do their utmost to ensure that their respective sector continues to operate normally—or, in the event of an interruption, that it is restored as quickly as possible. ESF 12 is the function dedicated to energy, with three primary roles: (1) coordinate energy operations, (2) monitor energy-centric critical infrastructure and respond to disruptions, and (3) restore and sustain essential services to maintain community functionality (TDEM, 2025 p33).

References

1. Albers, J. R., M. Newman, A. Hoell, M. L. Breeden, Y. Wang, and J. Lou. December 13, 2022: The February 2021 Cold Air Outbreak in the United States: A Subseasonal Forecast of Opportunity. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, Volume 103: Issue 12, pg E2887 – E2904. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1175/BAMS-D-21-0266.1 and https://journals.ametsoc.org/view/journals/bams/103/12/BAMS-D-21-0266.1.xml

2. Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Energy Sector. Available at: https://www.cisa.gov/energy-sector

3. Cybersecurity Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). NIPP 2013 National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Available at: https://www.cisa.gov/national-infrastructure-protection-plan

4. National Centers for Environmental Information (NCEI). February 24, 2023. The Great Texas Freeze: February 11-20, 2021. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Available at: https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/great-texas-freeze-february-2021

5. Svitek, Patrick. January 3, 2022. Texas puts final estimate of winter storm death toll at 246. The Texas Tribune. Available at: https://www.texastribune.org/2022/01/02/texas-winter-storm-final-death-toll-246/

6. The Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM). Available at: https://www.tdem.texas.gov/

7. The Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM). Preparedness. Available at: https://www.tdem.texas.gov/preparedness

8. The Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM). State planning. Available at: https://www.tdem.texas.gov/preparedness/state-planning

9. The Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM). February 2020. State of Texas Emergency Management Plan. Basic Plan. Available at: https://assets-global.website-files.com/5fcfde680bd548c23d797aef/6058fdfac077d20dbee58213_2020-State-of-Texas-Basic-Plan_WEBSITE_05_07_gs.pdf

10. The Texas Division of Emergency Management (TDEM). January 2025. State of Texas Emergency Management Plan. Basic Plan. Available at: https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/5fcfde680bd548c23d797aef/6792afa0f7785d9d63d2f952_State%20of%20Texas%20Emergency%20Management%20Basic%20Plan%20Jan%202025%20Updated.pdf

11. The Texas Tribune. Winter Storm 2021. Available at: https://www.texastribune.org/series/winter-storm-power-outage/